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In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,' the Su-
preme Court held that the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities
Act of 19332 (the "1933 Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of
19341 (the "1934 Act") do not apply to participation interests in
compulsory, non-contributory pension plans.4 The Supreme Court's
Daniel decision has been widely acclaimed as ending the uncer-
tainty which plagued the pension industry since the 1976 district
court decision in Daniel v. Teamsters. 5 In fact, some commentators
1. 99 S. Ct. 790 (1979), rev'g 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1977) [hereinafter referred to as the 1933 Act]. See note 64
infra and accompanying text.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1977) [hereinafter referred to as the 1934 Act]. See notes 66,
80, 81 infra and accompanying text.
4. The pension plan at issue in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel was
the Teamsters Local 705 Pension Plan, first established in 1954. 99 S. Ct. 790, 793. The
Local 705 plan was intended to constitute a qualified plan under IRC § 401 et seq. Id. at 799.
Under the Local 705 plan eligible employees of participating Chicago area trucking companies
automatically became plan participants. Id. at 793. All plan contributions were the responsi-
bility of participating employers pursuant to the prevailing collective bargaining agreements
in effect from time to time. Id. For a discussion of the characteristics of the Local 705 plan
and other typical retirement plan variations, see text accompanying notes 13-58 infra.
5. 410 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ill. 1976). Cf. Hodges, The Daniel Decision: Its Impact, 15
PENSION WORLD 20 (March 1979) [hereinafter cited as Hodges]; Pensions & Investments,
Jan. 29, 1979, at 1, col. 2; Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1979, at 4, col. 1. Much of the concern regarding
Daniel stemmed from the costs which would have been experienced by plans in complying
with the anti-fraud rules. A widely reported actuarial study prepared for the Secretary of
Labor concluded in early 1978 that the costs of a final decision consistent with the lower court
opinions could cost the sponsors of private retirement plans as much as $39.6 billion. George
B. Buck Consulting Actuaries, Inc., Report to the Secretary of Labor on the Potential Effects
of Affirmation of the Appeals Court Decision in Daniel v. Teamsters, at l1-1, IH-3 (March
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in the popular press have suggested that Daniel protects retirement
plans from any federal securities regulation.'
Despite the importance of Daniel to employers maintaining com-
pulsory, non-contributory pension plans, the scope of that decision
remains uncertain.7 Justice Powell's opinion was firmly based on the
unique characteristics of the Teamsters' pension plan.' It is by no
means certain that the Court's refusal to apply anti-fraud rules to
such plans may be relied upon by plan sponsors maintaining differ-
ent types of retirement programs.' Further, certain other federal
20, 1978) (unpublished study prepared under Contract J-9-P-7-0064 available through Public
Disclosure Room, Department of Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs, Washington,
D.C.), excerpts reprinted in 185 PENSION REP., (BNA) R-11 (April 24, 1978).
6. See, e.g., Chicago Tribune, Jan. 17, 1979, §1 at 2, col. 3., 1, 3, 6.
7. Several lower court decisions have recently been announced which may signal the
development of an expansive reading of International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel.
Black v. Paine, 591 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1979) (contributory, compulsory pension plan); Tanuggi
v. Grolier, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 1209, (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (contributory and elective defined bene-
fit pension plan). However, it is premature to characterize these cases as representative of
an emerging judicial consensus that Daniel should be broadly interpreted.
8. 99 S. Ct. at 797-98, 800-01. The Court refused to apply federal securities law anti-
fraud rules because of its conclusion that non-contributory, compulsory pension plans do not
satisfy the Court's traditional definition of investment contracts for securities law purposes.
Id. at 798. This traditional test of an investment contract requires proof based on the eco-
nomic realities of the transaction that the complaining party invested money in a common
enterprise with an expectation of profits through the managerial or other efforts of another.
Id. at 797. See United Housing Corp. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851-52 (1975); SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298, 301 (1946).
Speaking for the Court, Justice Powell concluded that Mr. Daniel's employment decision
to surrender his labor as a whole for a compensation package "substantially devoid of aspects
resembling a security" was merely a sale of his labor for a livelihood and was not an invest-
ment in the future. 99 S. Ct. at 797.
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Powell stressed that the plan was non-contributory
and participation was compulsory. Id. It is unclear whether a contributory plan or a plan
under which participation is elective would be viewed as equally devoid of substantial
aspects resembling a security and as involving no investment decision. But cf. note 7 supra
and text accompanying notes 114-15, 138-41 in!ra.
Further, in rejecting the plaintiff's claim that he had an expectation of a profit from the
managerial efforts of the pension plan trustees, Justice Powell stressed the fact that fund
earnings played a relatively insignificant role in determining the amount of benefits Mr.
Daniel could receive and in insuring that adequate funds would be available. 99 S. Ct. 790
at 797. It is unclear whether retirement plans such as profit sharing plans or money purchase
pension plans which involve a direct relationship between fund earnings and the amount of
plan benefits will also be found to lack the requirement of an expectation of profits from the
managerial efforts of others. But cf. text accompaning note 149 infra.
9. Id. Although the Court's decision in Daniel was based upon its conclusion that partici-
pation interests in non-contributory, compulsory pension plans are not investment contracts,
there was also an alternative rationale offered by Justice Powell:
If any further evidence were needed to demonstrate that pension plans of the type
involved are not subject to the Securities Acts, the enactment of ERISA in 1974
would put the matter to rest. . ..
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securities law restrictions will continue to apply to retirement plans
including compulsory, non-contributory pension plans even after
Daniel. '0 The purpose of this article is to explore the application of
the federal securities law to qualified retirement plans following
Daniel. 11
The article will primarily focus on the application of registration
and anti-fraud rules to plan participation interests. 2 However, fed-
eral securities law implications of plan investments in securities will
The existence of this comprehensive legislation governing the use and terms of
employee pension plans severely undercuts all arguments for extending the Securi-
ties Acts to non-contributory, compulsory, pension plans. 99 S. Ct. 790, 801-02
(1979).
The Court's view that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 829
(codified in scattered sections of titles 5, 26, 29 U.S.C.), displaced any potential application
of the securities laws was in part based upon its conclusion that there was no evidence that
Congress at any time viewed non-contributory plans as subject to federal securities regula-
tion. Id. at 798. The Court's review of legislative history relied upon by the SEC revealed
only "that Congress might have believed certain kinds of pension plans, radically different
from the one at issue here, came within the coverage of the Securities Acts." Id. It is un-
clear whether the Court would consider such "radically different plans" as including con-
tributory plans generally or merely plans in which employee contributions are invested in
employer securities. If such "radically different plans" includes contributory plans generally,
then many profit sharing plans and money purchase pension plans and some defined benefit
pension plans could be viewed as subject to securities anti-fraud restriction. However, if the
Court only had in mind plans in which voluntary employee contributions are invested in
employer securities, then the Court's referral to "radically different plans" may be viewed
merely as recognition of the long-standing SEC position that such plans are fully subject to
federal securities law registration as well as anti-fraud requirements. See generally text
accompanying notes 150-52 infra.
10. See notes 182-239 infra and accompanying text.
11. Qualified retirement plans satisfy the requirements for qualification set forth in I.R.C.
§401 et seq. These requirements are designed to require broad and non-discriminatory cover-
age of employees by qualified programs. I.R.C. §§ 401, 410. In addition, qualified plans must
meet additional requirements designed to require that plan benefits become non-forfeitable
after the passage of relatively few years of employment or upon plan termination. I.R.C. §§
401, 411. Qualified plan participants benefit from favorable tax rules which result in deferral
of tax on qualified plan contributions until benefits are actually paid and which result in
special tax treatment of benefits payments. I.R.C. §§ 72, 402. Finally, earnings on qualified
plan assets are not separately taxed prior to distribution to plan participants. I.R.C. §§ 401,
501, 805(d).
The scope of this article is limited to a discussion of the federal securities law requirements
applicable with respect to qualified corporate retirement plans. For discussions of the applica-
tion of federal securities law to HR-10 or Keogh plans, individual retirement plans, guaran-
teed investment or annuity contracts and variable annuities, see Williams, Employee Benefit
Plans, 11 REv. OF SEcuarriEs REG. 803 (1978) (HR-10 Plans); Relationship of SEC to Qualified
Employee Plans, 2 REAL PROP. PROS. & TRUST J. 570 (1967) [hereinafter cited as SEC
Relationship] (HR-10 and variable annuities).
12. In its attempts to assert jurisdiction over qualified retirement plans, the SEC has
characterized participation in retirement plans as "participation interests" which are securi-
ties. The SEC has distinguished between such participation interests and other securities
which are acquired or held as plan investments. See generally notes 116-49 infra and accom-
panying text.
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also be discussed. To set the stage for these discussions the article
will first describe typical retirement plan provisions and the general
statutory framework in which these federal securities law issues
arise.
I. TYPICAL RETIREMENT PLAN FEATURES
Pension historians generally agree that the first organized retire-
ment plan maintained by a private employer was established in
1875.1 The first private plan, maintained by American Express
Company, was a fairly simple plan which provided fixed benefit
payments for permanently disabled employees who retired after at-
taining age sixty years and completing twenty years of service.' 4
From this rudimentary foundation an elaborate system of private
retirement plans has evolved. 5 Over the past century, the hall-
mark of this sytem has been its flexibility." This flexibility allows
employers of all sizes in widely diverse industries to tailor retire-
ment programs to meet employee aspirations while serving a variety
of business objectives. 7
A meaningful discussion of the impact of federal securities laws
on retirement plans requires an understanding of basic distinctions
among retirement plans. Although an exhaustive description of the
infinite variations is beyond the scope of this article, an introduction
to typical retirement plan characteristics is necessary.
In considering retirement plan variations, it will be useful to
distinguish between defined benefit pension plans and defined
contribution plans, contributory and non-contributory plans and
compulsory and elective plans.
13. See, e.g., PENSION STUDY TASK FORCE, GENERAL SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, HOUSE COMM.
ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 92d CONG., 2d SESS. INTERIM STAFF REPORT, 5 (Comm. Print 1972)
[hereinafter cited as INTERIM REPORT]; GREENOUGH & KING, PENSION PLANS AND PuBuc PoLICY
27-28 (1976); 1 LATIMER, INDUSTRIAL PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 20-
21(1932).
14. See authorities cited in note 13 supra.
15. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 13 at 6-10. See also Siegfried, The Role of Private
Pensions, PRIVATE PENSIONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 1, 9-12 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Private Pensions]. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE
REIrEMENT AND WELFARE PROGRAMS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS 1-2 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as 1965 PRESIDENTIAL REPORT]; TUBE, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSION
PLANS 13-53 (1976) [hereinafter cited as PENSION FUTrURE]. For other authorities, see
Lindquist, Simplification for Business Taxpayers ERISA-Was All This Really Necessary?
in 1 ALI-ABA CONFERENCE PAPERS: CONFERENCE ON FEDERAL INCOME TAX SIMPLIFICATION 291
and n.8 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ERISA SIMPLIFICATION].
16. Private Pensions, supra note 15. See also 1965 PRSIDENTIAL REPORT, supra note 15,
5-8; Hunter, Don't Undermine the System . . . Expand It, 8 TRIAL MAGAZINE 27 (Nov./
Dec. 1972).
17. See authorities cited in note 16 supra.
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A. Defined Benefit Pension Plans
and
Defined Contribution Plans
The Teamsters' pension plan considered in Daniel was a defined
benefit pension plan.'" Defined benefit pension plans provide fixed
or determinable benefits."9 Plan benefits are typically described in
a benefit formula as an amount payable in monthly or annual in-
stallments beginning at a specified retirement age, typically age
sixty-five. 20 The precise monthly or annual payments described
in the plan formula are payable only to participants who actually
retire at the stated age and receive benefits in the same manner.
Participants who begin to receive benefits at a different age or in a
different form will receive an adjusted monthly or annual amount.2 '
The amount actually received by such employees is a result of ad-
justments designed to take into account the fact that the employees
receive their benefits earlier or in a different form.22
Participants in a defined benefit pension plan who are entitled to
vested benefits= will receive the formula benefit, after any adjust-
ments, whether or not plan investment results meet the expectation
of the plan sponsor. As long as the employers contributing to the
plan remain solvent and continue that plan in effect, 4 they will
typically be required to make whatever contributions are necessary
under the appropriate funding method to provide the formula bene-
fit for eligible plan participants.2 The amount of the annual contri-
bution is determined pursuant to annual mathematical calculations
prepared by an actuary utilizing assumptions regarding plan invest-
ment experience, employee turnover, employee mortality and other
relevant factors.2 ' Thus, because employers are usually obligated to
18. 99 S. Ct. at 794 n.3. See also note 4 supra.
19. Treas. Reg. §1.401:1(b)(1)(i)(1956); IRS, GUIDES FOR QUALIFICATION OF PENSION,
PROFIT-SHARING, AND STOCK BONUS PLANS, (PUBL. 778) at pt. 2(m) (1972) [hereinafter cited
as IRS GUIDE]. But see Rev. Rul. 185, 1953-2 C.B. 202; Rev. Rul. 68-116, 1968-1 C.B. 177.
20. Cf. I.R.C. §§411(a)(8)(B), 415(b)(2)(A).
21. Cf. I.R.C. §415(b)(2)(B); Rev. Rul. 71-446, Sec. 4.02, 1971-2 C.B. 187, 189. Many plans
provide for early retirement prior to age 65 and provide other methods of payment such as
term certain or contingent annuitant methods which permit retirement payments to continue
to a beneficiary following the participant's death.
22. I.R.C. §415(b)(2)(B); Rev. Rul. 71-446, §4.02, 1971-2 C.B. 187, 189.
23. Plan participants are entitled to a nonforfeitable or "vested" plan benefit upon satis-
fying the requirement for retirement or upon satisfying the vesting requirements of the plan.
I.R.C. §411. Qualified retirement plans must satisfy one of the minimum vesting standards
set forth in I.R.C. §411.
24. Treas. Reg. §1.411(a)-(4)(a)(1977).
25. See generally I.R.C. §412. But see text accompanying notes 27-28 infra.
26. Id.
[Vol. 10
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make the necessary contributions, the risk of poor investment per-
formance or adverse actuarial experience ordinarily rests with the
employer. Of course, employers also ordinarily benefit from favora-
ble investment results or other favorable actuarial experience.
While defined benefit plans ordinarily involve a commitment by
the employer to contribute amounts actuarially necessary to provide
plan benefits, there is one notable exception. Multi-employer
collectively bargained plans typically involve only a limited contri-
bution obligation on the part of the participating employers. Such
plans usually require contractually fixed contributions for each
hour, day or week of employment. Actuarial reports are taken into
account in the negotiation process so that in theory the required
contributions should be sufficient over the term of the labor agree-
ment to provide plan benefits. 21 The plan involved in Teamsters v.
Daniel was a pension plan of this type.2
Defined contribution plans provide for no fixed or determinable
benefits. Rather, such plans provide for a fixed predetermined for-
mula for allocating contributions and plan investment earnings or
losses among plan participants. 2' The ultimate benefit payable to
any plan participant will be entirely dependent upon the amount
of plan contributions, the investment return on those contributions
and any extraordinary allocations because of benefits forfeited by
other plan participants who terminate employment prior to vest-
ing. 30 Thus, unlike defined benefit plans in which plan participants
are generally immune from the adverse impact of poor investment
experience, the benefits of plan participants in defined contribution
plans will be directly affected by plan investments.
Defined contribution plans provide for individual account bal-
ances reflecting each plan participant's share in the underlying trust
assets.3' Such account balances are adjusted at least once a year to
reflect earnings or losses, additional contributions and forfeitures. 32
By contrast, defined benefit pension plans typically do not provide
for any individual accounting for plan benefits since the employer
27. For a good description of such multiemployer plans and a criticism of certain short-
comings in this approach to funding pension benefits, see ERISA SiMPLIFICATION, supra note
15 at 291-95 and nn. 9-26. See also 1965 PRSMENTIAL REPoRT, supra note 15 at 5-8.
28. 99 S. Ct. at 793.
29. Rev. Rul. 70-125, 1970-1 C.B. 87; Rev. Rul. 73-103, 1973-1 C.B. 191; Rev. Rul. 74-340,
1974-2 C.B. 128. See also Treas. Reg. §1.401-1(b)(2)(ii)(1956); IRS GUIDE, supra note 19 at
pt. 2(t).
30. See authorities cited in note 29 supra.
31. Compare I.R.C. §411(b)(2)(B) and I.R.C. §411(c)(2)(A) with Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 §3(34), 29 U.S.C. §1002(34) (1977) [hereinafter cited as ERISA].
See also note 30 supra.
32. Compare Rev. Rul. 70-125, 1970-1 C.B. 87 with Rev. Rul. 73-103, 1973-1 C.B. 191 and
Rev. Rul. 74-340, 1974-2 C.B. 128.
19791
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 10
bears the risk of investment loss and funding is conducted on an
aggregate basis.3
All defined benefit plans are so-called pension plans.34 However,
certain pension plans, known as money purchase pension plans, are
defined contribution plans.3 Profit sharing plans and stock bonus
plans are also defined contribution plans .3 Contributions may only
be made to profit sharing plans for a taxable year in which the
employer has current or accumulated profits.37 Stock bonus plans
are designed for the distribution of plan benefits in the form of
securities issued by the plan sponsor.3 So called employee stock
ownership plans or ESOP's provide for investment of plan assets
in such securities and are typically defined contribution plans of
the stock bonus type.
B. Contributory and Non-Contributory Plans
All qualified retirement plans provide for employer contribu-
tions .3  However, not all plans provide for employee contributions.
For example, the Teamsters' pension plan discussed in Daniel
neither required nor permitted employee contributions. 0 In this
respect, the Teamsters' plan is typical of most defined benefit
pension plans."
33. Although defined benefit plans do not ordinarily provide for separate accounting,
exceptions exist where employee contributions are separately accounted for. I.R.C.
§411(b)(2)(A)-(c). In addition, individual funding is utilized in the case of variable benefit
plans and plans funded on a level annual individual premium basis. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 185,
1953-2 C.B. 202; I.R.C. §§412(h)(2), 412(i).
34. Compare I.R.C. §4140) with IRS EMPLOYEE PLANS TRAINING PROGRAM 131,701-716
(1975) [hereinafter cited as IRS TRAINING PROGRAM].
35. Compare Treas. Reg. §1.401-1(b)(1)(i) with Rev. Rul. 74-385, 1974-2 C.B. 130. See also
IRS TRAINING PROGRAM, supra note 34, 103, 131.
36. Compare I.R.C. §414(i) with IRS TRAINING PROGRAM supra note 34, 103, 131. Per-
sons unfamiliar with qualified plans may be understandably confused by the distinction
between pension plans and profit sharing plans. Unfortunately, this confusion was heightened
by the adoption of ERISA. For purposes of title I of ERISA, but not for purposes of title II of
ERISA, the term "pension plan" is defined to include profit sharing and other retirement
plans. ERISA §§3(2), 3(34), 3(35), 29 U.S.C. §§1002(2), 1002(34), 1002(35).
37. Compare Treas. Reg. §1.401-1(b)(1)(ii)-(iii) (1956) with IRS GUIDE, supra note 19 at
pt. 2(g) and Rev. Rul. 66-174, C.B. 1966-1, 81. See generally 1 PENs. PLAN GUmE (CCH)
2432-43 (3d ed.).
38. Treas. Reg. §1.401-1(b)(1)(iii)(1956). See generally 1 PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH)
2445-45J (3d ed.).
39. Individual Retirement Accounts maintained by employees typically do not provide for
contribution by their employers, although such contributions are permissible under certain
circumstances. I.R.C. § 219(a). However, IRA's are qualified not under I.R.C. § 401 but under
I.R.C. §408 and are beyond the scope of this article. See note 11 supra.
40. 99 S. Ct. at 793.
41. See, e.g., BANKERS TRUST COMPANY, 1975 STrUY OF CORPORATE PENSION PLANs 6-7 and
table 3 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975. PENSION STUDY].
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Employee contributions to retirement plans may either be volun-
tary or mandatory. Among retirement plan professionals, however,
a plan is considered "contributory" only if contributions are manda-
tory.
Plans which provide for voluntary contributions typically also
provide a mechanism for determining a separate plan benefit or a
separate plan account which is attributable to such contributions. 2
This separate benefit or account is fully vested and will be payable
whether or not the employee is ultimately entitled to any other plan
benefits. 3 Defined contribution plans often provide for voluntary
contributions whereby an employee may supplement his or her re-
tirement savings." Voluntary employee contributions are less fre-
quently permitted in defined benefit pension plans. 5 This may be
because the required separate accounting for plan benefits results
in hybrid plans bearing certain resemblances to defined contribu-
tion plans." Of course, this resemblance is limited to the employee
contribution feature since other benefits will continue to be deter-
mined on the basis of the plan's benefit formula."7
Plans providing for mandatory contributions also may provide for
separate accounting for benefits attributable to employee contribu-
tions or for a method for determining the portion of the plan benefit
attributable to such contributions. 8 Although some defined contri-
bution plans, commonly referred to as "thrift plans,"" require man-
datory contributions, such contributions are not limited to defined
contribution plans. 50
Defined benefit pension plans which require mandatory contribu-
tions do not always provide that the benefit attributable to such
contributions is payable over and above the formula benefit. On the
contrary, many defined benefit pension plans requiring mandatory
42. Separate accounting is required in the case of voluntary contributions to defined
benefit plans. I.R.C. §411(b)(2)(A). Although employee contributions need not be reflected
in separate defined contribution plan account balances, I.R.C. §411(c)(2)(A), such separate
accounts are typically utilized unless all plan benefits are fully vested. If all benefits are fully
vested, separate accounting serves no essential purpose and would merely increase plan
record keeping expenses.
43. I.R.C. §411(a)(1).
44. BANKERS TRUST COMPANY, 1977 STUDY OF EMPLOYEE SAVINGS AND THuF PLANS, 17-18
(1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Tmur PLAN STUDY]; 1 METZGER, PRoFrr SHARING IN 38
LARGE COMPANIES 7, 17-19, table 13 and chart 3 (1975) [hereinafter cited as PRoFrr SHARING
IN LARGE COMPANIES].
45. 1975 PENSION STUDY, supra note 41 at 7 and table 3.
46. I.R.C. §411(b)(2)(A); I.R.C. §411(d)(5).
47. I.R.C. §411(d)(5).
48. I.R.C. §411(c)(2).
49. 1 PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 2453-58 (3d ed.). See also 1977 THmr PLAN STUDY, supra
note 44.
50. 1975 PENSION STUDY, supra note 41 at 7 and table 3.
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contributions apply those benefits towards funding the costs of pro-
viding the benefits described in the benefit formula.51 However, even
plans which apply participant contributions towards the formula
benefit are required to separately determine a benefit attributable
to those contributions.5 2 The benefit so determined constitutes a
minimum benefit which must be provided under such plans. In no
event will the employee or the employee's beneficiaries receive an
aggregate benefit of less than the employee's contribution with sta-
tutory interest. 53 Of course, some defined benefit plans treat manda-
tory contributions in the same fashion as they would treat voluntary
contributions by providing a supplementary benefit attributable to
such contributions.5 '
C. Compulsory and Elective Plans
Retirement plans, including the Teamsters' pension plan de-
scribed in Daniel,55 typically require that all employees who fall
within the eligible group automatically participate in the plan.5
Some plans, most notably plans requiring mandatory employee
contributions, limit participation to employees who elect to parti-
cipate.57 However, because of qualification requirements designed
to broaden coverage of retirement plans, the vast majority of retire-
ment plans are not elective.58
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Federal securities law is embodied in no fewer than six basic
statutes." However, only the three acts which are of greatest import-
51. Compare I.R.C. §411(a)(7) and I.R.C. §411(b) with I.R.C. §411(c)(2)(B).
52. I.R.C. §411(c)(2)(B).
53. I.R.C. §411(a)(1); I.R.C. §411(c)(2)(B).
54. This approach actually is more cosmetic than substantive. Plans using this approach
provide a two-step benefit formula in which the supplementary benefits attributable to
the mandatory employee contributions could be incorporated into a single formula without
any reduction in the total accrued benefits.
55. 99 S. Ct. at 793.
56. 1975 PENSION STUDY, supra note 41 at 6; PROFIT SHARING IN LARGE COMPANIES, supra
note 44 at 17-19 at table 13.
57. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
58. I.R.C. §410(b). See note 56 supra. Coverage rules require compliance with strict per-
centage tests or coverage which is otherwise non-discriminatory. Because of a tendency for
lower paid employees to disproportionately refuse participation, the general non-discrimi-
natory coverage test is difficult to satisfy where participation is voluntary. In addition, the
percentage tests are strict enough to preclude widespread use of those tests to support the
qualification of elective plans.
59. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77aa (1978); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§78a-78kk (1978); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§79-
79z-6 (1978); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§77aaa-77bbbb (1978); Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§80a-1-80a-52 (1978); Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. §§80b-1-80b-21 (1978).
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ance to retirement plans, the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act and the 1940
Investment Company Act" (the "1940 Act") will be considered.
A. Securities Act of 1933
The 1933 Act is designed to protect purchasers of securities by
requiring disclosures regarding offerings of securities. Persons offer-
ing securities are required to file registration statements with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for presale review and
are required to provide purchasers with a prospectus at the time of
the offering or sale.6 These requirements are not applicable to offer-
ings of exempt securities.2 The registration requirements are also
inapplicable to certain exempt offering or sales transactions. 3
The 1933 Act also imposes anti-fraud liability for material mis-
statements or omissions of material facts by offerors in connection
with a sale of securities. 4
B. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The 1934 Act is designed to regulate stock exchange and over-the-
counter trading of securities and to prevent unfair practices in such
trading. The Act requires registrations, disclosures and periodic re-
ports, 5 and imposes liability for material fraudulent statements,
misstatements or omissions in connection with such filings or in
connection with sales of securities generally."6
Issuers of exchange listed securities, issuers of most securities
traded over-the-counter 8 and issuers of securities which are not
traded but are widely enough held" must file 1934 Act registration
statements. Such issuers are also required to file annual and other
periodic reports. 0 Under the 1934 Act anti-fraud provisions, issuers
may also be required to disclose material inside information regard-
ing business operations either as part of the annual or other periodic
60. 15 U.S.C. §§80a-1-80a-52 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as the 1940 Act].
61. §§5, 12(1), 15 U.S.C. §§77e, 771.
62. §3, 15 U.S.C. §77c. For a discussion of 1933 Act exemptions as they relate to retire-
ment plans, see notes 154-70 infra and accompanying text.
63. §4, 15 U.S.C. §77d. For a discussion of these exemptions as they relate to retirement
plans, see notes 97-108 infra and accompanying text.
64. §§11(a), 12(2), 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§77k, 771(2), 77q(a).
65. §§12, 13, 15 U.S.C. §§781, 78m, 78o.
66. §10, 15 U.S.C. §78j; Rule lob-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1978).
67.. §12(a), 15 U.S.C. §781(a) (prohibition against trading in unregistered classes of securi-
ties on national exchanges).
68. §12(g), 15 U.S.C. §781(g).
69. Id.
70. }}13(a), 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§78m(a), 78o(d).
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reports or through press releases or other public disclosures.7 The
disclosures may be required even though there is no contempora-
neous trading of the affected securities. Issuers must also comply
with special tender offer 2 and proxy solicitation rules."
Stock exchanges," brokers,'7  dealers,7 certain shareholders and
other insiders are also subject to 1934 Act reporting and disclosure
rules. Certain shareholders and other insiders are also subject to
special reporting and anti-fraud rules. For example, holders of
greater than five percent of any class of shares of issuers registered
under the 1934 Act are required by section 13(d) of the 1934 Act
to report such holdings.77 Insiders, including officers, directors and
shareholders owning ten percent or more of the outstanding stock
are required by section 16(a) of the 1934 Act to report acquisitions
and sales of an issuer's registered securities.78 In addition, such
insiders are subject to the section 16(b) short swing profit rules,
which permit an issuer to recover profits realized by such insiders
on purchases and sales of its securities within any six-month
period.79 Insiders may also be required to disclose material infor-
mation affecting the value of issuer's securities.80 Of course, pur-
chasers and sellers of securities are subject to the anti-fraud re-
strictions of Rule 10b-5. 11
C. Investment Company Act of 1940
The 1940 Act is designed to protect investors who have acquired
or are considering acquiring an investment interest in mutual funds,
investment trusts or other companies engaged in the business of
71. §10, 15 U.S.C. §78j; Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5. Compare SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, at 861 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1969) and Heit
v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, at 914 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969) with Allen,
The Disclosure Obligation of Publicly Held Corporations In the Absence of Insider Trading,
25 MERcER L. REV. 479, at 488-94 (1974). While there is no private right of action under Rule
10b-5 absent such a contemporaneous purchase or sale, the SEC has standing to assert Rule
lOb-5 claims even where no buyer or seller has standing under the Birnbaum Rule. Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729 (1975).
72. §§13(d), 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§78m(d), 78n(d)-(f).
73. §§14(a)-(c), 15 U.S.C. §§78n(a)-(c).
74. 9H5, 6, 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §978e, 78f, 78q. Stock exchanges must also comply with SEC
rules under the 1934 Act regarding exchange operations. Id.
75. §§15(a)-(b), 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§78o(a)-(b), 78f(a). Brokers are also subject to 1934 Act
anti-fraud restrictions and must comply with special indebtedness, hypothecation, short sale
and other rules. §§77(c), 8(a)-(c), 9(a), 11, 14(b), 15(c), 15 U.S.C. §§78g(c), 78h(a)-(c); 78i(a),
78k, 78n(b), 78o(c).
76. Id. §§7(d), 16(d), 15 U.S.C. §§78g(d), 78p(d).
77. §13(d), 15 U.S.C. §78m(d).
78. §16(a), 15 U.S.C. §78p(a).
79. §16(b), 15 U.S.C. §78p(b).
80. Cf. note 71 supra.
81. §§9(a), 10(b), 15 U.S.C. §78i(a), 78j(b); Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5.
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investing in securities."2 The Act provides for registration and other
reporting and disclosure by such investment companies 3 as well as
by certain affiliated persons. 4 The Act also imposes fiduciary duties
on investment companies and their officers, directors, principal
underwriters and other affiliated persons. 5 The 1940 Act prohibits
or regulates various management practices and service charges or
fees and prohibits certain conflicts of interest and self-dealing trans-
actions.8 Certain types of entities which are already subject to ex-
tensive regulation pursuant to other federal statutes are expressly
excluded from the definition of investment companies." These in-
clude banks, savings and loan associations, insurance companies,
brokers, underwriters and bank common or commingled funds.88
III. REGISTRATION AND ANTI-FRAUD REQUIREMENTS
Registration obligations and anti-fraud restrictions under the
1933 Act are triggered by the occurrence of events or transactions
which may be viewed as offerings of securities. The relevant issue
is whether plan participation is the result of an offer or sale of a
security. In this regard, the SEC has argued that participation
implies a participation interest which is transferable to the em-
ployee by sale as is any other security. 0
The primary registration requirements of the 1934 and 1940 Acts
are triggered by the status of the reporting entity and not merely
by the occurrence of specific events. Thus, 1934 Act registration
must be completed with respect to an issuer's securities only if the
issuer falls within the purview of that Act because its securities are
listed on a national exchange, are traded over-the-counter or are
widely enough held.8 The 1934 Act anti-fraud rules apply to assure
truthful and complete statements in 1934 Act registrations and dis-
closures. However, these rules also apply to offerings of securities
subject to the 1933 Act regardless of the status of the securities
under the 1934 Act. For this reason the 1933 and 1934 Act anti-fraud
rules will be considered together.
82. §§1, 3, 4, 5,15 U.S.C. §§80a-1, 80a-3, 80a-4, 80a-5.
83. §§7, 8, 24(a), 30, 15 U.S.C. §§80a-7, 80a-8, 80a-24(a), 80a-29.
84. §30(f), 15 U.S.C. §80a-29.
85. §36, 15 U.S.C. §80a-35.
86. §§10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 26, 27, 28, 35, 15 U.S.C. §§80a-10, 80a-11, 80a-12,
80a-13, 80a-15, 80a-16, 80a-17, 80a-18, 80a-21, 80a-26, 80a-27, 80a-34.
87. §3(c), 15 U.S.C. §80a-3(c).
88. Id.
89. §4, 15 U.S.C. §77e.
90. See notes 116-49 infra and accompanying text.
91. See notes 67-69 supra and accompanying text.
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An entity which satisfies the 1940 Act definition of an investment
company and which is not exempt from 1940 Act registration must
register under that Act."
A. Registration of Offerings of Plan
Participation Interests and
Anti-Fraud (1933 Act)
The registration requirements and the anti-fraud restrictions of
the 1933 Act may only apply to transactions or events which consti-
tute "offers" or "sales."' 3 In addition, those requirements and re-
strictions are not applicable unless the object of the offer or the sale
is a "security."" However, the registration requirements of the 1933
Act are not applicable to all such offerings of securities. The 1933
Act also includes a number of exemptions which may be applicable
to retirement plans, including one exemption which is expressly
applicable to most such plans. 5
1. "Offer" or "Sale" Requirement. The 1933 Act only requires
registration and only imposes anti-fraud liability with respect to
"sales" of securities or "offers to sell" which are defined in section
2(3) of the 1933 Act:
(3) The term "sale" or "sell" shall include every contract of sale
or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value. The
term "offer to sell", "offer for sale", or "offer" shall include every
attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a
security or interest in a security, for value . 6
(a) No Sale Exemption. In applying the 1933 Act to retirement
plans prior to 1970 the SEC took the position that most types of
retirement plans are not subject to registration requirements be-
cause they do not involve a "sale."' 7
Pursuant to this "no sale" rationale the SEC concluded that no
92. See notes 83-84 supra and accompanying text.
93. See notes 97-115 infra and accompanying text.
94. See notes 116-49 infra and accompanying text.
95. See notes 97-115, 154-70 infra and accompanying text.
96. §2(3), 15 U.S.C. §§77b(3).
97. Compare Letter from John F. Davis, S.E.C. Assistant General Counsel (Sept. 1941),
reprinted in 1 PENs. PLAN GumE (CCH) 1104.101 (3d ed.) [hereinafter cited as 1941 SEC
Opinion], and Letter from S.E.C. Assistant Director, Division of Corporation Finance to
Commerce Clearing House (May 12, 1953), reprinted in 1 PENs. PLAN GUEDE (CCH) 1104.102
(3d ed.) [hereinafter cited as 1953 SEC Opinion], and Letter from S.E.C. Chief Counsel,
Division of Corporation Finance to Commerce Clearing House (Aug. 1, 1962), reprinted in 1
PENs. PLAN GuIDE (CCH) 1104.103 (3d ed.) [hereinafter cited as 1962 SEC Opinion] with 3
SEC Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission 996-97
(1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC Study].
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sale or offering takes place with respect to retirement plans which
either prohibit employee contributions 8 or require employees to
participate.9 Further, the SEC refused to take enforcement action
to require registration of offerings of participation interests in plans
providing for voluntary employee contributions unless such plans
permitted the investment of such voluntary contributions in stock
or other securities of the plan sponsor or its affiliates. 00
Although the SEC has never expressly applied its no sale ration-
ale to anti-fraud rules, the SEC failed to take anti-fraud enforce-
ment action with respect to retirement plans involving no sale for
registration purposes.101
In its Daniel briefs the SEC argued for the first time that the
definition of a sale is broader for anti-fraud purposes than for regis-
tration.' 2 Specifically, the SEC argued that participation in all
types of retirement plans involves the sale of securities, whether or
not participation is elective. 0 3 Although the Daniel court disposed
of the SEC's assertion of anti-fraud jurisdiction, it did not directly
reach the no sale issue.1'0 However, in disposing of the SEC's posi-
tion on the basis that no security was present, the Court made
reference to the SEC's past pronouncements in a context which
strongly indicates that the SEC's past failure to enforce anti-fraud
restrictions may only be construed as indicative of a long-standing
SEC view that retirement plans were generally exempt from 1933
and 1934 Act anti-fraud rules. 05 Certainly, the SEC's long silence
prior to Daniel regarding the applicability of the no sale rationale
for anti-fraud purposes may not be used to indicate that the SEC
consistently has viewed the rationale as extending only to registra-
tion issues. Rather, this silence is explained in part by the SEC's
98. See, e.g., 1941 SEC Opinion, supra note 97; 1953 SEC Opinion, supra note 97; 1962
SEC Opinion, supra note 97; SEC Study, supra note 97, at 996-97.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., 1953 SEC Opinion, supra note 97; 1962 SEC Opinion, note 97; SEC Study,
supra note 97, at 997; High Voltage Eng'r. Corp. (avail. Jan. 19, 1979); Baxter Travenol Labs.,
Inc. (avail. Jan. 15, 1979); United States Trust Co. (avail. Jan. 11, 1979).
101. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S.Ct. 790, 800-01 (1979).
102. Brief for SEC as amicus curiae, at 70-89, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 99 S.Ct. 790 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SEC Brief]; brief for SEC as amicus curiae
at 34-53, Daniel v. Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977) [hereinafter cited as SEC 7th
Circuit Brief].
103. SEC Brief, supra note 102 at 83-89; SEC 7th Circuit Brief, supra note 102 at 39-41,
45-50.
104. 99 S. Ct. at 801.
105. Id.
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long-standing policy of refusing to issue prior rulings regarding anti-
fraud issues.'0 6
(b) Section 3(a)(2) Exemption. In 1970 Congress reflected the
SEC's no sale view in a specific 1933 registration exemption under
Section 3(a)(2).' °7 However, the precise wording of the Section
3(a)(2) exemption insofar as it addresses participation interests in
corporate retirement plans extends only to participation interests in
single or collective trust funds maintained with banks and separate
accounts maintained with insurance companies.10 No such restric-
tions were included in the SEC's traditional no action position.'08
(c) Present Status of Traditional No Sale View. Since 1970 the
SEC has by and large avoided reference to the no sale theory in its
no action letters, referring instead to Section 3(a)(2) or to general
policy considerations as the basis for its no action positions with re-
spect to retirement plans. 10 However, even before Daniel, there were
some indications that the SEC's cryptic reference to policy consider-
ations in its post-1970 no action letters may simply be a shorthand
expression for the no sale theory."' In any event the SEC reiterated
106. Cf. Securities Act Release No. 5098, (c) (Dec. 1, 1970).
107. §3(2), 15 U.S.C. §77c(2).
108. Id. Despite the restrictive language of Section 3(a)(2), the SEC has not limited
application of that section to plans funded through trusts having bank trustees. In its no
action letters interpreting Section 3(a)(2), the SEC has applied the statutory exemption
where a bank merely serves as a "stakeholder." Compare Merideth Corp. (avail. Feb. 26,
1976) with Merideth Corp. (Aug. 12, 1976).
109. See notes 97-100 supra and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., High Voltage Eng'r. Corp. (avail. Jan. 19, 1979); Baxter Travenol Labs.,
Inc. (avail. Jan. 15, 1979); Newpark Res., Inc. (avail. Jan. 15, 1979); United States Trust Co.
(avail. Jan. 11, 1979); Marion Labs., Inc. (avail. Oct. 19, 1978); Norton-Simon, Inc. (avail.
June 8, 1978); Southern Team Co. (avail. April 12, 1976); George A. Hormel & Co. (avail.
March 2, 1976). Cf. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. (avail. July 2, 1976); Hurley Electronics, Inc.
(avail. June 21, 1976).
111. In Congressional testimony before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Com-
mittee on Human Resources, Harold M. Williams, Chairman of the SEC, testified with re-
gard to the history of the SEC's no sale theory that "the situation today at the Commission
with respect to the registration of pension interests is fundamentally the same as it has been
since the Commission's creation." Oversight of ERISA, 1977: Hearings on S2125 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 108
(1977).
In December of 1977, Peter J. Romeo, Chief Interpretive Attorney of the SEC's Division
of Corporation Finance, in explaining the SEC's position regarding Daniel, stated that:
It must be emphasized that the SEC's position concerning the possible sale of a
security in the context of a non-contributory pension plan has expressly been lim-
ited to the application of the anti-fraud provisions only. Thus, the SEC has not
disavowed the no-sale theory insofar as the registration provisions are con-
cernedr . . .
Address by Peter J. Romeo, ALI-ABA ERISA and Securities Laws Conference (Dec. 10, 1977)
reprinted in 168 PENSION REP. (BNA) R-7, at R-8 (Dec. 19, 1977) [hereinafter cited as
Romeo]. See also SEC STUDY, supra note 97 at 996-97. Further elaboration of the SEC's views
after Daniel may be expected to be available in an interpretive release scheduled to be issued
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its pre-1970 no sale rationale in its Daniel amicus briefs."' In addi-
tion, the pre-1970 no sale rationale was tacitly accepted by the
Court in Daniel."3
Thus, there may be a basis in the SEC's own recent actions as well
as in Daniel to conclude that the SEC's pre-1970 no sale rationale
continues to be viable. If a plan satisfies the no sale rationale, it
should be viewed as not involving an offering or a sale for purposes
of the 1933 Act registration or anti-fraud provisions whether or not
the plan is covered by section 3(a)(2).
The no sale rationale applies to both defined benefit pension
plans and defined contribution plans."' That rationale is also
equally applicable to contributory and non-contributory plans-and
to compulsory and elective plans."5 That rationale should be viewed
as continuing to exempt all retirement plans which do not provide
for the investment of voluntary employee contributions in securities
issued by a plan sponsor, without regard to section 3(a)(2).
2. "Security" Requirement. Registration under the 1933 Act may
only be required and 1933 Act anti-fraud prohibitions are only
applicable if the property offered for sale is a "security." 6 For
purposes of the 1933 Act a security is defined in section 2(1) of that
Act as:
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral -trust certificate, preorganization
certificate of subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificates, certificate of deposit for a security, frac-
tional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
"security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, tempo-
rary or interim certificate for, receipts for, guarantee of, or warrant
or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 7
This definition was intended to be broadly interpreted to include
any arrangement which comes within the ordinary concept of a
late in 1979. Address by Edward F. Greene, Dir. SEC Div. Corp. Fin., National Assn. Over-
the-Counter Companies, (Sept. 20, 1979) reprinted in 258 Pension Rep. (BNA) A-11 (Sept.
24, 1979).
112. SEC Brief, supra note 102, at 64-67; SEC 7th Circuit Brief, supra note 102 at 35-37.
113. 99 S. Ct. at 799-801.
114. Unlike the Supreme Court's Daniel opinion which focused on the presence or absence
of a security, the no sale view simply does not address that issue. The sole issue is whether
participation is elective or mandatory and whether the investment of employee contributions
in employer stock is otherwise voluntary.
115. Id.
116. §2(1), 15 U.S.C. §77b(1).
117. Id.
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security regardless of the title given the arrangement by its issuer."'
In applying this broad definition the courts have been guided by the
economic realities of the arrangements under consideration."' This
economic realities test has resulted in judicial determinations that
ship shares in fishing boats 0 and real property interests in orange
groves' are securities, while stock in a cooperative housing associa-
tion is not.'22
In arguing that retirement plan participation interests are securi-
ties, the SEC has at various times taken the position that such
interests are either "investment contracts" or "certificates of inter-
est or participation in profit sharing agreements" within the mean-
ing of section 2(1) of the 1933 Act.'23 However, the SEC has tradi-
tionally given greater emphasis to the argument that such partici-
pation interests are investment contracts.'
In Daniel the Court limited itself to consideration of the argument
that such interests are investment contracts. 2 ' However, the Court
stated that its analysis of the "security" requirement would apply
regardless of the specific language of section 2(1) which is relied
upon by the party asserting that the 1933 Act is applicable.'26 The
118. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933). See SEC Study, supra note 97,
at 995; Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YMzA L.J. 171, 182-83 (1933)
[hereinafter cited as Douglas]; Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability of the Federal Securi-
ties Laws to Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 795, 801 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Mundheim]. A number of lower courts have taken the position that the
term "security" should be "liberally construed" to serve the remedial purposes of the securi-
ties laws. See, e.g., Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoller & Danneberg Explor., Ltd., 544 F.2d
1059 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977); Collins v. Rukin, 342 F.Supp. 1282
(D.Mass., 1972); United States v. Attaway, 211 F.Supp. 682 (D.La. 1962); United States v.
Monjar, 47 F.Supp. 421 (D.Del. 1942), aff'd 147 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
859 (1944).
119. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S. Ct. 790 (1979); United
Housing Corp. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848, 851-52 (1975); Tcherepin v. Knight, 389 U.S.
332 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
120. SEC v. Pyne, 39 F. Supp. 434 (D.Mass. 1941).
121. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), rehearing den. 329 U.S. 819 (1946).
122. United Housing Corp. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
123. E.g., Hearings before Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 4344,
H.R. 5065, & H.R. 5832, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 895 (1941) [hereinafter cited as 1941 Hearings]
(investment contract); SEC Brief, supra note 102 at 30 (investment contract); 1941 SEC
Opinion, supra note 97 (investment contract and certificate of profit-sharing); Mundheim,
supra note 118 at 801-802 (investment contract and certificate of profit-sharing); SEC Rela-
tionship, supra note 11 at 570 (investment contract and certificate of profit-sharing); Note,
Pension Plans as Securities, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 550-51, 562 (1948) [hereinafter cited as
Pension Securities] (investment contract and certificate of profit-sharing).
124. Compare 1941 Hearings, supra note 123 at 895, and 1941 SEC Opinion, supra note
97, and Pension Securities, supra note 123 at 562, with International Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. Daniel, 99 S. Ct. 790 (1979) and SEC Brief, supra note 102 at 30.
125. 99 S. Ct. 790, 796 (1979).
126. Id. at 796 n.11.
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Court noted that Daniel's counsel had argued in the alternative
that the participation interest in question was such a certificate of
interest and observed that:
Daniel also argues that his interest constitutes a "certificate of
interest in or participation in a profit-sharing agreement." The
court below did not consider this claim, as Daniel had not seriously
pressed the argument and the disposition of the "investment con-
tract" issue made it unnecessary to decide the question. 561 F.2d
1223, 1230 n.15 (1977). Similarly, Daniel here does not.seriously
contend that a "certificate of interest in . . . a profit-sharing
agreement" has any broader meaning under the Securities Acts
than an "investment contract." In Forman, supra, we observed
that the Howey test, which has been used to determine the pres-
ence of an investment contract, "embodies the essential attributes
that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security."
421 U.S. at 852, 95 S.Ct. at 2060.'2
Thus, the circumstances in which retirement plan participation in-
terests may constitute securities may be comprehensively discussed
solely in the context of the Court's well-established guidelines for
determining whether an arrangement constitutes an investment
contract.
(a) Howey Test. At least since the 1942 decision in SEC v. W. J.
Howey Co.,'2 the Court has stated that an arrangement is not an
investment contract within the meaning of section 2(1) of the 1933
Act unless, viewed in terms of its economic realities, "the scheme
involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with prof-
its to come solely from the efforts of others.' 1 29 As subsequently
explained by the Court in United Housing Corp. v. Forman,130 and
in Daniel, 3 the Howey test has two separate and distinct elements.
First, there must be an investment of money; second, there must
be a reasonable expectation of profits from the managerial efforts
of others. Both elements must be present or the 1933 Act will not
apply to the arrangement. 32
(i) Investment of Money. In Daniel, Justice Powell offers a co-
herent description of the factors which will determine whether a
scheme or arrangement involves an investment of money. Justice
127. Id.
128. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
129. Id. at 301. Accord, United Housing Corp. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975);
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S. Ct. 790, 796 (1979).
130. 421 U.S. 837, 851-58 (1975).
131. 99 S. Ct. 790, 796-98 (1979).
132. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946); United Housing Corp. v. Forman,
421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S. Ct. 790,
796 (1979).
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Powell's opinion focuses on the economic realities of the arrange-
ment when viewed as an indivisible whole.' 3  Daniel establishes the
principle that there is no investment of money unless the invest-
ment aspects of the "total and indivisible" transaction, which
"cannot be segregated" into an investment portion and a non-
investment portion, are a significant motivating factor for the oc-
currence of the transaction.'
3
In comparing the "relative significance" of the investment and
non-investment characteristics, Justice Powell has focused on the
"primary motivation" for engaging in the transaction.' 31 In both
Forman and Daniel, the Court concluded that the prime motiva-
tion for entering the arrangements in question was an aspect of the
transaction which was unrelated to any investment features.' 36 In
Daniel the Court concluded that the plaintiff had accepted em-
ployment primarily to obtain a livelihood and not to make an
investment in the compulsory, non-contributory pension plan
maintained jointly by the representatives of his union and of his
employers. 37
Although the portion of the Daniel opinion dealing with the
investment of money will not provide any significant comfort to
plans in which participation is elective, it should offer a safe harbor
to compulsory, non-contributory defined benefit pension plans
even though such plans require or permit employee contribu-
tions.'1 Further, this safe harbor should be logically extended to
compulsory, non-contributory plans.3 9 Thus, the first element of
Howey as applied in Daniel should be extended to exclude all
retirement plans from 1933 Act coverage except plans in which
employees actually have a choice whether or not to participate.
Even compulsory, contributory plans should be viewed as not
involving an investment of money. Participation interests in such
plans are no more an investment than under compulsory, non-
133. 99 S. Ct. at 797.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.; United Housing Corp. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 (1975).
137. 99 S. Ct. at 799.
138. Accord, Camp v. Guercio, 464 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Pa. 1979). Daniel involved a situ-
ation in which plan participation was an inevitable result of employment. Even where parti-
cipation is delayed until minimum service, minimum age requirements or other similar re-
quirements are satisfied, the rationale that there is no investment remains applicable. Just
as with the Daniel situation, the fact of plan participation is merely a result of accepting and
remaining in employment, which in turn is primarily the result of the employee's desire for
a livelihood. The latter situation differs from the facts of Daniel only in that participation is
delayed. However, eligibility still flows automatically from the decision to accept and remain
in employment primarily to obtain a livelihood.
139. As the test is described in Daniel, there is no greater investment of money in ac-
ceptance of employment which automatically involves eligibility under a defined contribu-
tion plan than under a defined benefit plan. Even where plans are elective or provide for vol-
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contributory plans. Where participation is compulsory the primary
motive for entering or remaining in employment remains substan-
tially devoid of investment characteristics. Clearly the indivisible
non-investment motive of obtaining a current livelihood is much
more significant than the investment aspects.
This extension of Daniel is clearly justified in the case of plans
requiring mandatory contributions, since participants have no
choice whether or not to make contributions. 10 However, extension
of Daniel to compulsory qualified plans which permit voluntary
contributions would also be defensible. Under Internal Revenue
Service rulings such contributions by any participant are limited
to ten percent or less of the participant's current compensation
during any year. 4 ' Thus viewing the employment decision as an
indivisible whole as Daniel requires, the voluntary contribution
feature of such plans is relatively insignificant when compared to
the primary motive for plan participation, continuation of employ-
ment.
(ii) Reasonable Expectation of Profit From Efforts of Others.
Even if participation in a retirement plan is elective, so as to raise
the possibility that the first element of the Howey test is satisfied,
such a participation interest may fail to satisfy the second element
of Howey. A retirement plan participation interest cannot consti-
tute a "security" subject to the 1933 Act unless it involves a rea-
sonable expectation of profits from the managerial efforts of oth-
ers. 14
2
In Forman and Daniel the Court elaborated on the economic
realities standard."3 For purposes of the economic realities test it
is not enough that through some attenuated set of circumstances
a profit may result from the efforts of others."' As with the first
element of Howey, the second element is tested by focusing on the
more significant aspects of the transaction and not on its less im-
portant aspects. 14 Applying this comparative analysis, the Court
in both Forman and Daniel concluded that for purposes of Howey,
the possibility of deriving a profit as a result of secondary aspects
untary contributions, plan participants typically have little or no control over the time and
manner of payment of benefits prior to attaining the plan's retirement age. Even at retire-
ment, participants in defined contribution plans rarely have control over the manner of pay-
ment. Further, plan benefit rights differ from typical investment securities because partici-
pants are prevented from transferring their plan benefits prior to actual payment. See note
176 infra and accompanying text.
140. Accord, Black v. Paine, 591 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1979) (defined benefit pension plan).
141. Compare Rev. Rul. 59-185, 1959-1 C.B. 86 with Rev. Rul. 69-627, 1969-2 C.B. 92.
142. United Housing Corp. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 854-57 (1975).
143. Id. at 848-51. See Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S. Ct. 790, 796 (1979).
144. United Housing Corp. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 854-58 (1975); Teamsters v. Daniel,
99 S. Ct. 790, 797-98 (1979).
145. 99 S. Ct. 790, 797-98.
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of the arrangement is "too speculative" and "too insubstantial" to
bring an arrangement within the 1933 Act.4 6
The Daniel opinion focused on the fact that a fixed rate of bene-
fits was provided regardless of earnings derived from the invest-
ment efforts of the retirement plan's trustees. 7 The Court stressed
that the commitment of the employers to provide the promised
benefit and the savings to the plan which could result from ac-
tuarial experience due to mortality or employee turnover were far
more significant in determining whether benefits would actually be
received so as to render the potential profit to plan participants
derived from plan earnings insignificant. 48
The Daniel analysis of the profit element of the Howey test
should be extended beyond the precise facts of Daniel. The same
basic analysis would seem appropriate to provide all defined bene-
fit plans with a safe harbor."9 However, this language would pro-
vide no protection for elective defined contribution plans are di-
rectly dependent on the trust investment earnings.
Thus, an expansive application of the Howey test in Forman and
Daniel indicates that with the possible exception of elective defined
contribution plans, all retirement plans should be viewed as pro-
tected by the Howey test from 1933 Act registration and anti-fraud
requirements. When combined with the traditional no sale concept
this broad application of Daniel would leave only elective defined
contribution plans in which employee voluntary contributions are
invested in employer securities subject to the 1933 Act. In fact even
if the traditional no sale rationale is not adopted by the Court, the
ERISA preemption language in Daniel may offer an alternative
basis for excluding all other elective, defined contribution plans
from the 1933 Act.
(b) ERISA Preemption. Even though an application of the Howey
test after Daniel may permit 1933 Act coverage of elective, defined
contribution plans, the Daniel decision offers an alternative basis
for concluding that retirement plans including elective, defined con-
tribution plans not involving the investment of voluntary employee
contributions in employer securities should escape 1933 Act cover-
age. Specifically, the Court stated that even if the Howey analysis
and the history of SEC inaction did not mandate exclusion of retire-
146. United Housing Corp. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 856 (1975); Teamsters v. Daniel, 99
S. Ct. 790, 798 (1979).
147. 99 S. Ct. 790, 797.
148. Id.
149. Accord, Black v. Paine, 591 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1979) (compulsory, contributory de-
fined benefit pension plan); Tanuggi v. Grolier, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(elective defined benefit plan with both mandatory and voluntary contributions).
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ment plans from 1933 Act coverage, the passage of ERISA would do
SO.15
0
While the Court's preemption discussion reiterates the precise
facts applicable to Mr. Daniel,' the Court's reasoning would be
equally applicable to all types of plans to the extent that longstand-
ing SEC practice would not have imposed 1933 Act requirements.
This expansive interpretation of the Daniel preemption language
would exclude most elective defined contribution plans from the
coverage of the 1933 Act. However, this interpretation would leave
room for the continued application of the 1933 Act to elective de-
fined contribution plans providing for the investment of voluntary
employee contributions in securities of a plan sponsor. When ERISA
was adopted such plans had consistently been viewed as subject to
1933 Act registration under section 3(a)(2) and under the traditional
no sale rationale. 52
3. Specific 1933 Act Registration Exemptions. Even under the
expansive interpretations of Daniel suggested above, the 1933 Act
may apply to elective defined contribution plans in which voluntary
employee contributions may be invested in employer securities.
However, participation interests in such plans may nonetheless be
exempt from 1933 Act registration requirements by virtue of specific
statutory exemptions. Because the section 3(a)(2) exemption would
not be of any assistance to such a plan, 5 ' the most important of
these exemptions are the intrastate offering exemption,'54 the pri-
vate offering exemption'" and the small offering exemption.' How-
ever, a brief review of the exemption under section 3(a)(2) is an
appropriate prelude to a discussion of these exemptions.
(a) Section 3(a)(2) Exemption. Even under the expansive inter-
pretation of Daniel suggested above, at least one type of plan may
remain fully subject to the 1933 Act. As discussed above, it is un-
likely that Daniel will be interpreted as excluding an elective de-
150. 99 S. Ct. 790, 801-02. See generally Preemption and ERISA, 13 REAL PROP. PROBATE
AND TRUST L.J. 977 (1978); Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 23, 69-70, 79 (1978).
151. 99 S. Ct. 790, 801-02 (1979).
152. See notes 97-100 supra and accompanying text.
153. §3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(2) (1977). The §3(a)(2) exemption incorporates the
SEC's traditional "no sale" view. Under this no sale theory, elective plans providing for
the investment of voluntary employee contributions in employer securities are subject to
1933 Act registration requirements. See notes 97-115 supra and accompanying text.
154. §3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(11) (1978). See notes 159-64 infra and accompanying
text.
155. §4(2), 15 U.S.C. §77d(2). See notes 165-67 infra and accompanying text.
156. §3(b), 15 U.S.C. §77c(b); Rule 240, 17 C.F.R. §230.240 (1978); Rules 251-63, 17
C.F.R. §§230.251-230.63 (1978). See notes 168-70 infra and accompanying text.
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fined contribution plan from the 1933 Act if that plan permits the
investment of an employee's voluntary contributions in securities
of the plan sponsor. For all the uncertainty which the SEC has dis-
played over the years in applying the 1933 Act to retirement plans
in general, that agency has consistently applied the Act to such
elective plans.
Justice Powell may have had such plans in mind when he stated
on behalf of the Court that:
The SEC in its amicus curiae brief refers to several actions of
Congress said to evidence an understanding that pension plans are
securities. A close look at each instance, however, reveals only that
Congress might have believed certain kinds of pension plans, radi-
cally different from the one at issue here, came within the coverage
of the Securities Acts. There is no evidence that Congress at any
time thought noncontributory plans similar to the one before us
were subject to federal regulation as securities."'
The Court does not expressly describe the "radically different
plans" which Congress may have viewed as subject to the 1933 Act
requirements. However, reference to plans not exempted by virtue
of section 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act may indicate that the Court had
in mind retirement plans providing for the investment of voluntary
employee contributions in securities of the plan sponsor. 158
(b) Intrastate Offering Exemption. Section 3(a)(11) of the 1933
Act provides an exemption for offerings which are limited to pur-
chasers who are within a single state.'59 However, the state must be
the same state in which the issuer is incorporated and doing busi-
ness.'8 0 The exemption is not available if the plan's trustee is a non-
resident'"' or if the underlying employer securities held by the trus-
tee are not also eligible for the exemption.'62 In addition, a plan
sponsor may only take advantage of this exemption if all plan par-
157. 99 S. Ct. 790, 798.
158. Id. at 799 n.19.
159. (11) Any security which is part of an issue offered and sold only to persons
resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a
person resident and doing business within or, if a corporation, incorporated by and
doing business within, such State or Territory.
§3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(11). See also Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. §230.147 (1978). The SEC
adopted Rule 147 to provide guidance and a safe harbor against SEC enforcement. However,
Rule 147 includes restrictions on resales to nonresidents within nine months after the final
sale and other restrictions not expressly included in §3(a)(11). Id.
160. Id. See, e.g., Continental Investors Life Ins. Co., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,084. See also Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. §230.147 (1978).
161. Continental Investors Life Ins. Co., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 78,084.
162. Rochester Tel. Corp. (avail. July 3, 1978).
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ticipants reside in that same state.' 3
Any medium or large company that maintains a retirement plan
would have difficulty complying with these requirements.'"
(c) Private Offering Exemption. Section4(2) of the 1933 Act pro-
vides an exemption for private offerings. 65 However, the exemption
will not apply to a plan covering a large number of employees or an
unsophisticated group of employees.'66 As a practical matter these
standards drastically restrict the availability of the private offering
exemption with regard to retirement plans which often cover either
a large or an unsophisticated group of employees.' 7
(d) Small Offering Exemptions. Two small offering exemptions
are available. The first is available under Rule 240 with respect to
issues of up to $100,000 provided there are no more than 100 benefi-
cial owners of the offered securities following issuance.' 8 Another
small offering exemption is available under Regulation A if the ag-
gregate employee contributions to the plan for the plan year in
question do not exceed $1.5 million.' 9 However, this exemption only
relieves the plan of a portion of the registration requirements.'7"
B. Registration of Plan Participation
Interests and Anti-Fraud
Restrictions (1934 Act)
The registration requirements of the 1934 Act technically apply
with respect to classes of "securities."' 7 In practice, these registra-
tion obligations do not actually relate to the terms and conditions
of any particular class or offering of securities. Rather, the 1934 Act
163. Cf. Queens County Medical Soc'y., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 78,687.
164. But cf. SEC Interpretive Letter of Dec. 6, 1974, [1975-79 Transfer Binder] PENS.
PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 23,918 (3d ed.).
165. §4(2), 15 U.S.C. §77d(2). See also Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. §230.146 (1978). Rule 146 is a
safe harbor protecting issuers from SEC enforcement. However, the rule is in many ways
more restrictive than the statutory exemption. Id.
166. See generally Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. §230.146 (1978); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346
U.S. 119 (1953).
167. But cf. SEC Interpretive Letter of May 7, 1971, 1 PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 1136.25
(3d ed.).
168. This exemption is available under Rule 240 pursuant to the authority of §3(b) of the
1933 Act. However, the exemption only avoids the registration requirements. Anti-fraud rules
would still be applicable. Compare §3(b), 15 U.S.C. §77c(b) with Rule 240, 17 C.F.R. §230.240
(1978).
169. Compare §3(b), 15 U.S.C. §77c(b) with Rules 251-63, 17 C.F.R. §§230.251-.63 (1978).
On September 5, 1979 a new small issue rule was proposed by the SEC. This new Rule 242
will raise the small issue exemption to $2 million. SEC Release 33-6121.
170. Compare 1953 SEC Opinion, supra note 97, with 1962 SEC Opinion, supra note 97.
171. §12(g), 15 U.S.C. §781 (g).
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registrations function as status reports regarding issuers and other
reporting persons.7 2 In fact, these reports must be filed whether or
not there is a current offering of securities.
To the extent that registration is not required under the 1934 Act
the anti-fraud rules applicable to the content of such registration
requirements would obviously not apply. However, the anti-fraud
prohibitions of Rule 10b-5 are also applicable with respect to offers
and sales of securities subject to the 1933 Act.'73 For these purposes,
the same analysis used in connection with the 1933 Act anti-fraud
rules applies.
Thus, after Daniel, Rule 10b-5 should be viewed as applicable
only to participation interests in elective defined contribution plans
which provide for the investment of voluntary employee contribu-
tions in employer securities.
Participation interests in retirement plans are generally exempt
from registration under the 1934 Act by virtue of Rule 12h-2(a), 174
which provides that the registration requirements of section 12(g)
do not apply to:
(A) any interest or participation in an employee stock bonus, stock
purchase, profit sharing, pension, retirement, incentive, thrift,
savings or similar plan which is not transferable by the holder
except in the event of death or mental incompetency, or any secu-
rity issued solely to fund such plans ....
Rule 12h-2(a) effectively exempts participation interests in quali-
fied plans from 1934 Act registration because such plans expressly
prohibit any such transferability of plan benefits as a prerequisite
to tax qualification. "'
C. Registration of Retirement Plans
(1940 Act)
Investment companies and certain affiliated persons are required
to comply with the registration and other reporting requirements of
172. §§12(a), 12(g), 13(a), 15 U.S.C. §§781(a), 781 (g), 78m(a).
173. §10(b), 15 U.S.C. §78j(b); Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1978).
174. Rule 12h-2(a), 17 C.F.R. §240.12h-2(a) (1978). See, e.g., Newpark Resources, Inc.
(avail. Jan. 15, 1979); U.S. Bancorp (avail. Jan. 2, 1979); Hershey Foods Corp. (avail. July
3, 1978);' Rochester Tel. Corp. (avail. June 19, 1978) (no action on 1934 Act but 1933 Act
registration may be required because employee contributions may be invested in employer
securities).
175. Rule 12h-2(a), 17 C.F.R. §240.12h-2(a) (1978).
176. I.R.C. §401(a)(13). Under ERISA, even non-qualified retirement plans must now
prohibit benefit assignments. ERISA §206(d), 29 U.S.C. §1056(d). Therefore, it may be
expected that the SEC's traditional distinction between qualified and non-qualified retire-
ment plans in no action letters concerning §12(g) will eventually be abandoned.
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the 1940 Act. "7 Retirement plans not funded solely through insur-
ance policies or annuity contracts appear to satisfy the general
definition of an investment company. 17 8 However, section 3(c)(11)
of the 1940 Act expressly excludes from the definition of an invest-
ment company:
any employee's stock bonus, pension or profit sharing trust which
meets the requirements for qualification under Sectioli 401 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954; or any collective trust fund main-
tained by a bank consisting solely of the assets of such
trusts .... "I
Section 3(c)(11) also provides for an exemption in the case of quali-
fied plans funded through insurance separate accounts.' 0 The SEC
has also extended the exemption to group trusts maintained for
employees of more than one member of a related group of com-
panies. "I
IV. FEDERAL SEcuRrTIEs REGULATION OF
RETiREMENT PLAN INVESTMENTS
This article suggests that federal securities law restrictions should
not apply to participation interests in most qualified retirement
plans. However, no such blanket exemption would be appropriate
for plan investments in traditional securities.
As institutions devoted to the accumulation of retirement sav-
ings, retirement plans are major securities investors.8 2 Because of
the spectacular growth of retirement plans, such plans have an in-
creasingly significant impact on the financial markets. 18 Further, as
a crucial component of the nation's comprehensive retirement secu-
rity system,""' private retirement plans will only continue to effec-
177. §§7, 8, 24(a), 30, 15 U.S.C. §§80a-7, 80a-8, 80a-24(a), 80a-29.
178. 3, 15 U.S.C. §80a-3. See generally 1 PENs. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 1170. As employees'
securities companies, retirement plans would be subject to 1940 Act registration unless an
exemption was applicable. However, plans which merely involve the purchase of insurance
policies or annuity contracts are not even viewed by the SEC as employees' securities compa-
nies in need of exemption. 1941 SEC Opinion, supra note 97; 1962 SEC Opinion, supra note
97.
179. §3(c)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(11). See, e.g., Toppa & Trowsers Stock Bonus Plan
(avail. July 2, 1978); Hershey Foods Corp. (avail. July 26, 1978).
180. §3(c)(11), 15 U.S.C. §80a-3(11).
181. See, e.g., Baxter Travenol Labs, Inc. (avail. Jan. 17, 1979); American Tel. & Tel.
Co. (avail. Dec. 7, 1978).
182. See generally 5 PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 22,135; Pension Future, supra note 15, at
20 & Table 7.
183. See ERISA Simplification, supra note 15, at 291; PENSION FuruRa, supra note 15,
at 16-25. For current statistics on direct securities trading by pension plans, see 38 SEC
Statistical Bull. 7 (June 1979).
184. See generally PENSION FUTURE, supra note 15, at 16-25.
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tively serve the overall objective of that system if plan investments
benefit from the protections of federal securities law.
The impact of federal securities law on retirement plan invest-
ments will depend upon the nature of the particular investment
transactions in which such plans engage and upon the status of such
plans as holders of securities.
A. Retirement Plan as Purchaser of Securities
As a purchaser of securities the trustee of a retirement trust is
protected from a seller's fraud or nondisclosure by Section 17 of
the 1933 Act8 5 and Section 10 and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act.'
If the misstatement or omission occurs in a registered offering, the
plan is also protected by Section 11 of the 1933 Act.8 7 However,
sellers of securities with whom the trustee deals are also protected
by Section 10 and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act from any such fraud
or non-disclosure on the part of the trustee.
The acquisition of employer securities with voluntary employee
contributions may have significance for the registration of the plan
participation interest.'8 However, the acquisition of employer se-
curities in an offering by the issuer or by an affiliate may itself
violate the 1933 Act if it constitutes an offer or sale of securities
which has not been registered and which is not exempt.
The SEC has consistently taken a no action position with respect
to contributions of employer securities. 9 Where stock is purchased
directly from the employer, the SEC has often expressed a no action
position, apparently relying on the private offering exemption of
Section 4(2).110 If the purchase is made from a shareholder or on
the open market the purchase may also be exempt, apparently
under Section 4(1) of the 1933 Act as a transaction by a person
other than an issuer, underwriter or dealer. 9'
185. §17, 15 U.S.C. §77g.
186. §10, 15 U.S.C. §78j; Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5.
187. §11, 15 U.S.C. §77o.
188. Note 100 supra and accompanying text.
189. Cf., e.g., High Voltage Eng'r Corp. (avail. Jan. 19, 1979); Marline Oil Corp. (avail.
Jan. 4, 1979); Paccar, Inc. (avail. Dec. 1, 1978); Duriron Co., Inc. (avail. July 5, 1978); CSA
Financial Corp. (avail. May 10, 1978); Coastal Indus. (avail. March 14, 1978); Crowley Mari-
time Corp. (avail. Feb. 27, 1976). In a 1977 address, Peter J. Romeo, Chief Interpretive
Attorney of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance suggested that this no action position
is based upon a no sale theory. Romeo, supra note 111 at R-8.
190. Cf., e.g., U.S. Trust Corp. (avail. Jan. 11, 1979); Marline Oil Corp. (avail. Jan. 4,
1979); Paccar, Inc. (avail. Dec. 1, 1978); CSA Financial Corp. (avail. May 10, 1978). Accord,
Romeo, supra note 111 at R-8.
191. See, e.g., U.S. Trust Corp. (avail. Jan. 11, 1979); Harris Bankcorp, Inc. (avail. Nov.
24, 1978); Duriron Co., Inc. (avail. July 5, 1978); CSA Financial Corp. (avail. May 10, 1978);
Crowley Maritime Corp. (avail. Feb. 27, 1976). Cf. J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc. (avail. Oct. 16,
1978). See notes 202-06 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 10
19791 Retirement Plans After Daniel
Rule 10b-6 prohibits an issuer from directly or indirectly purchas-
ing its own securities at any time that it is engaged in a distribution
of such securities.9 2 The SEC has considered whether this prohibi-
tion extends to purchases by retirement plans maintained by
employer-issuers.'93 Recent no action letters suggest that purchases
by a retirement plan trustee will not violate Rule 10b-6 if the trustee
is independent from the employer and acts independently with re-
spect to the purchase of employer securities." 4
B. Plan as Holder of Securities
A retirement plan holding greater than five percent of the total
outstanding securities of a 1934 Act registered company will be re-
quired by Section 13(d) of the 1934 Act to report such holdings
and any further acquisitions of such securities to the issuer, to the
exchange on which the issuer's stock is traded, and to the SEC.,'
This requirement will apply even though a separate filing may be
required with respect to the same security holdings because a
plan participant has sufficient beneficial ownership of such secu-
rities.'96 In determining beneficial ownership, the SEC has con-
sidered the voting of shares by plan participants as determinative.' 7
In addition, a plan may hold more than ten percent of the out-
standing securities of such an issuer so as to constitute an insider
subject to the reporting rules of Section 16(a).'19 A plan subject to
those rules will be required to report any further acquisitions or
192. Rule 10b-6, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-6 (1978).
193. The SEC has often considered the extent to which qualified plans may be viewed as
alter egos for plan sponsors. Since it views a plan as affiliate of the issuer, the SEC has been
concerned whether Rule 10b-6 should be equally applicable to plan purchases of securities.
See, e.g., Piper Indus., Inc. (avail. March 6, 1972).
194. E.g., Armco, Inc. (avail. March 1, 1979); Jack Eckert Corp. (avail. Feb. 22, 1979);
Aluminum Co. of America (avail. Feb. 16, 1979); Middle South Utilities, Inc. (avail. Feb. 12,
1979); Ethan Allen, Inc. (avail. Jan. 11, 1979); American Tel. & Tel. Co. (avail. July 26, 1978).
Accord, Romeo supra note 111 at R-10, R-11.
195. §13(d), 15 U.S.C. §78m(d) (1977). See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
(avail. Dec. 19, 1977). See also SEC v. Posner, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. LAW REP.
(CCH) 93,049 and 93,569 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). In addition to the Section 13(d) reporting
requirement even certain plans which previously were exempt from Section 13(d) reporting
are now being required to file on an annual basis under Section 13(g). §13(g), 15 U.S.C.
§78m(g) (1977).
196. Norton-Simon, Inc. (avail. June 8, 1978); Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. (avail. June 8,
1978); Coastal Indus., Inc. (avail. March 14, 1978). Cf. Texas Indus., Inc. (avail. Feb. 16,
1979).
197. See, e.g., Norton-Simon, Inc. (avail. June 8, 1978); Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. (avail.
June 8, 1978); Coastal Indus., Inc. (avail. March 14, 1978). Although beyond the scope of this
article, it is significant that application of this beneficial ownership concept could cause an
employer which is not otherwise a reporting company to become subject to the 1934 Act
reporting requirements under §12(g). See, e.g., H.C. Prange Co. (avail. Feb. 20, 1978).
198. § §16(a), 16(b), 15 U.S.C. §78k(a), 78k(b). Although such a plan must report under
Rule 16a-8(c), it would arguably not be subject to potential Section 16(b) short swing profit
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sales of such securities and will be required to periodically report
its holdings in such securities.'
C. Plan as Seller of Securities
The anti-fraud restrictions of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts would
apply to the sales of securities by a plan.10 In addition, if any securi-
ties held by the plan are "restricted" (i.e., they have not been ac-
quired on the open market or in a registered offering), then such
shares may only be sold in a registered offering or pursuant to an
exemption.201
In addition to the private offering exemptions and the other regis-
tration exemptions discussed above, Section 4(1) of the 1933 Act
permits a person who is not an issuer, underwriter or dealer to sell
securities without registrations.2 02 However, because of the broad
definition of the term "underwriter," the SEC has provided Rule
144 as a safe harbor.2 0 ' By complying with the holding period,
manner of sale and other restrictions of Rule 144 a purchaser of
securities may avoid being deemed to be an underwriter subject to
the 1933 Act registration requirements upon subsequent resale.205
Shares held pursuant to Rule 144 pending expiration of these re-
strictions are referred to as "restricted stock" and the stock certifi-
cates evidencing such sales must bear a legend reflecting the resale
restrictions215
Ordinarily stock is not considered restricted unless it is acquired
directly or indirectly from the issuer or from an affiliate of the issuer
in a transaction or a chain of transactions not involving a public
offering. Therefore, retirement plan compliance with Rule 144 or
another exemption would not appear to be necessary prior to resale
of securities purchased on the open market or in a registered offer-
ing. However, as an affiliate of the employer maintaining the plan,
a retirement plan must comply with Rule 144 or otherwise have an
exemption even though the shares were not restricted when they
liability because Section 16(b) only applies to beneficial owners. §16(b) 15 U.S.C. §78k(b)
(1977).
199. Cf. Rio Grande Indus. (avail. Oct. 27, 1978); San Jose Water Works (avail. May 9,
1977); Amerada Hess Corp. (avail. Nov. 15, 1976); Oklahoma Nat'l Gas Co. (avail. July 2,
1976); First Wisconsin Bankshares Corp. (avail. Dec. 16, 1970).
200. See notes 64, 81 supra.
201. See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text.
202. §4(1), 15 U.S.C. §77d(1) (1977).
203. The term underwriter is defined as "any person who has purchased from
an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the
distribution of any security .... " §2(11), 15 U.S.C. §77b(11) (1978).
204. 17 C.F.R. §230.144 (1978).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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were acquired by the plan.07
Although retirement plans are affiliates no action letters have
permitted such plans to take advantage of Rule 144.108 However, a
no action letter issued in April, 1978 and reaffirmed in June, 1978
viewed a particular retirement plan as acting on behalf of the issuer
for whom Rule 144 is not available. 09 Accordingly, the SEC staff
concluded that Rule 144 would not be available and advised that
the plan could sell the securities only if they were registered or if
another exemption was available. t 0
Although this letter raises some interesting technical questions,
it arose in the context of unique facts and may be expected to be
limited to those facts. The letter involved the termination of an
overfunded plan under which annuities had already been purchased
for all plan participants."' Since the entire proceeds of the sale of
the securities could revert to the issuer,"' the SEC's staff position
could be justified on the basis that the sale by the plan was func-
tionally no different than a sale by an issuer. If the transaction were
recast and the stock reverted in kind to the issuer, any subsequent
sale would certainly be subject to registration requirements unless
another exemption is available. Therefore, the position taken by the
SEC staff is justified if limited to its precise facts.
D. Segregated or Earmarked Investment in Securities
Segregating securities investments or earmarking securities for
particular plan participants may trigger participant duties or liabil-
ities under Sections 13(d) and 16 of the 1934 Act.
1. Section 13(d) of the 1934 Act. Section 13(d) of the 1934 Act
requires reporting of holdings and acquisitions of shares of a regis-
tered issuer by persons already holding in excess of five percent of
those shares.2 1 3 Shares owned and acquired are not limited to shares
in which the reporting person has actual legal title but includes
207. Cf. Harris Bankcorp, Inc. (avail. Nov. 24, 1978); J. C. Penny Co., Inc. (avail. Feb.
13, 1978); J. C. Penny Co., Inc. (avail. May 10, 1978). But see Leisure Technology Corp.
(avail. April 10, 1978); Leisure Technology Corp. (avail. June 16, 1978).
208. See, e.g., Harris Bankcorp., Inc. (avail. Nov. 24, 1978); J.C. Penny Co., Inc. (avail.
Feb. 13, 1978).
209. Leisure Technology Corp. (avail. April 10, 1978); Leisure Technology Corp. (avail.
June 16, 1978).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. I.R.C. §401(a)(2); Treas. Reg. §1.401-2 (1956).
213. §13(d), 15 U.S.C. §78m(d) (1978). See also notes 195-97 supra and accompanying
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shares beneficially owned .2 1 For purposes of Section 13(d), shares
are beneficially owned by persons having or sharing voting power
or the power to cause shares to be acquired or disposed of..' Even
pass through voting which is limited to extraordinary events such
as tender offers would provide a basis for applying the SEC's new
Section 13(d) beneficial ownership rules.2 1 This is particularly
significant because plan fiduciaries are increasingly viewing pass
through voting in such extraordinary circumstances as an advisable
safeguard against fiduciary conflict of interest liability and a good
defense to a hostile takeover bid.21 1
2. Section 16 of the 1934 Act. Beneficial ownership rules have
also been developed for purposes of the reporting and short swing
profit rules of Section 16 of the 1934 Act.218 However to the extent
that Rule 16a-8(g)(3) is available, plan participants are not treated
as beneficial owners of employer securities held for plan investment
prior to actual distribution."9 That rule exempts securities held in
the investment portfolio of a retirement plan provided the plan is
extended to employees generally. 20
In no action letters interpreting the beneficial ownership rules
applicable to Section 16 the SEC has advised on numerous occa-
sions that the Rule 16a-8(g)(3) exemption does not apply in the
case of plans with liberal plan withdrawal provisions.2 2' However not
all withdrawal provisions will result in application of Section 16.
Withdrawal provisions which include a substantial penalty for with-
drawal have been found by SEC to be consistent with the Rule
16a-8(g)(3) exemption.2 2
214. Id.
215. SEC Release 5925 (April 21, 1978); Norton-Simon, Inc. (avail. June 8, 1978). Cf.
Coastal Indus., Inc. (avail. March 14, 1978); Emhart Corp. (avail. March 2, 1978); San Jose
Water Works (avail. May 9, 1977).
216. SEC Release 5925 (April 21, 1978).
217. Cf. Rose & Collins, Porcupine Proposals, 12 REv. SECURIrrEs REG. 977, 979 (1979).
218. §16(a), 15 U.S.C. §78k(a) (1978); Rule 16a-8, 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-8; SEC Release 21,
17 C.F.R. §241.21; SEC Release 1965, 17 C.F.R. §241.1965; SEC Release 7793, 17 C.F.R.
§7793; SEC Release 7824, 17 C.F.R. §7824.
219. Rule 16a-8(g)(3), 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-8(g)(3).
220. See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. (avail. July 24, 1978). Cf. Security Pacific Corp.
(avail. Dec. 22, 1978); Cincinnati Milacron, Inc. (avail. Nov. 24, 1978); Schlumberger Ltd.
(avail. Oct. 16, 1978).
221. See, e.g., Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc. (avail. Jan. 15, 1979); Hershey Foods Corp.
(avail. July 3, 1978); General Tel. & Elec. Corp. (avail. April 20, 1978) and discussion of
withdrawal typical to thrift and savings plans but typically not liberal because of tax concerns
with constructive receipt. Cf. Amerada Hess Corp. (avail. Nov. 15, 1976).
222. See, e.g., Paccar, Inc. (avail. Dec. 1, 1978); Duriron Co., Inc. (avail. July 5, 1978).
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Even if Rule 16a-8(g)(3) is not satisfied, most plan participants
would be able to avoid Section 16(a) reporting obligations by virtue
of Rule 16a-8(b). 2 That rule exempts beneficial interests in
securities held in trust from reporting under Section 16(a) other
than interests of greater than twenty percent of the total value of
such securities.2 4
Under Rule 16a-10 acquisitions of securities which are not re-
quired to be reported under Section 16(a) will not result in short
swing profit liability under Section 16(b).22 If reporting is required
with respect to a retirement plan because of overly liberal with-
drawal provisions, application of the short swing profit rules of
Section 16(b) could nonetheless be avoided by participants in plans
satisfying rules of Rule 16b-3.22 Rule 16b-3 is applicable to share-
holder approved stock bonus, savings, or thrift plans which satisfy
the other requirements of that rule.22 Among other limitations,
Rule 16b-3 limits the discretionary selection of directors or officers
for plan participation and limits the aggregate dollar value and
number of shares which may be allocated. 228
E. Securities Distributed In Kind
Ordinarily, stock distributed in kind will not present a registra-
tion problem unless the employee has the right to select stock in lieu
of cash or other propertyY' However, distribution in kind may cre-
ate reporting obligations or short swing profit liabilities. Further,
resale may be restricted pursuant to Rule 144.23
1. Reporting Obligations of Sections 13(d) and 16 of the 1934
Act and Short Swing Profit Restrictions. Once securities are dis-
tributed in kind recipients of such distributions could be subject to
the reporting obligations of Sections 13(d) and 16 of the 1934 Act.23'
Further, the shares would have to be taken into account in deter-
mining insider compliance with the short swing profit rules.
2. Restriction of Resale Under Rule 144. Until recently, securities
distributed to plan participants which were not acquired in a regis-
tered offering have been viewed by the SEC as subject to continued
223. Rule 16a-10(b), 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-10(b). Cf. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co.
(avail. March 17, 1977); Amerada Hess Corp. (avail. Nov. 15, 1976).
224. Id.
225. Rule 16a-10, 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-10 (1978).
226. Rule 16b-3, 17 C.F.R. §240.16b-3 (1978).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Eastman Kodak Co. Savings & Investment Plan (avail. Feb. 23, 1976); McDonalds
Corp. Savings & Profit Sharing Plan (avail. Feb. 17, 1977).
230. See notes 234-39 infra and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., Callon Petrol. Co. (avail. Nov. 27, 1978).
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application of the Rule 144 restrictions on resale.32 Because the SEC
generally views a retirement plan as an affiliate of the plan sponsor,
even employer stock which was acquired on the open market or in
a registered offering has been viewed as restricted in the hands of
the retirement plan.2 Under this general rule, such restricted stock
could only be resold by the participant in a registered offering, in a
private or other exempt sale, or in compliance with the broker
transaction, trading volume, two year holding period and other
requirements of Rule 144.23 However, if the stock was earmarked
prior to distribution or if participants were given an opportunity to
elect an investment fund containing such stock, then the two year
waiting period would be deemed to have begun when the partici-
pant was first vested in the allocated securities.
3 5
Beginning with SEC Release 33-5750, issued in late 1976, the SEC
began to modify this general rule. 236 Based on this release and a
series of no action letters, an exception to the general rule that the
resale of stock distributed in kind will be restricted has firmly been
established. Under this exception, shares not acquired in a regis-
tered offering may be distributed without restriction on resale
provided:
(a) the shares represent a small percentage of the total outstand-
ing shares of the issuer and a small percentage of the trading vol-
ume in those shares;
(b) the shares of the issuer are widely traded on a national ex-
change or over-the-counter;
(c) there is no reason to believe that the resale of shares so
distributed will have a measurable impact on the market for such
shares; and
(d) such shares were not acquired by the retirement trust from
an issuer, an affiliate of the issuer or an underwriter." 7
Even where the fourth requirement has not been satisfied the
SEC has indicated that all restrictions will lapse following expira-
tion of the two year waiting period.23 8 Further, in a no action letter
232. Hollard & Yerkes, Employee Benefit Plans and Federal and California Securities
Laws, 33 Bus. LAw 1727, 1740 and n.43 (1978).
233. See notes 207-12 supra and accompanying text.
234. Cf. e.g., Marline Oil Corp. (avail. Jan. 4, 1978); Equipment Co. of America (avail.
Dec. 18, 1978).
235. Cf. Paccar, Inc. (avail. Dec. 1, 1978); Callon Petrol Co. (avail. Nov. 27, 1978); Harris
Bankcorp, Inc. (avail. Nov. 24, 1978).
236. Compare SEC Release No. 33-5243 with SEC Release No. 33-5750.
237. See, e.g., U.S. Trust Corp. (avail. March 15, 1979); High Voltage Eng. Corp. (avail.
Jan. 19, 1979); Meredith Corp. (avail. Nov. 13, 1978); Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. (avail. Sept.
25, 1978); American Tel. & Tel. Co. (avail. July 24, 1978).
238. Maine Pub. Serv. Co. (avail. May 8, 1978).
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where the SEC concluded that the criteria for application of this
exception were not satisfied, the SEC nonetheless concluded that
resale to the employer or the trust prior to expiration of the two year
waiting period without a broker trade and in excess of the volume
limits of Rule 144 would be permitted, although other resales by the
plan participant would continue to be restricted. 9
V. CONCLUSION
It is suggested in this article that Teamsters v. Daniel may be
interpreted broadly as applicable to most retirement plans. Al-
though no attempt has been made to discuss the public policies
which may be served by such an interpretation, the author believes
that such a broad interpretation would do much to revitalize the
private pension system which is only now recovering from the effects
of ERISA.
This article also suggests that federal securities laws will have
continued application to retirement plans as securities investors
following adoption of this expansive interpretation of Daniel.
239. Lionel D. Edie & Co. (avail. Dec. 27, 1976).
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